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The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy: 
Unravelling the Aquino Administration’s Bal-
ancing Agenda on an Emergent China 
Renato Cruz De Castro 
Abstract: From 2010 to 2016, then-President Benigno Aquino balanced 
China’s expansive maritime claim in the South China Sea. President 
Aquino challenged China by shifting the AFP’s focus from domestic 
security to territorial defence, bolstering closer Philippine–US security 
relations, acquiring American military equipment, seeking from Washing-
ton an explicit security guarantee under the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty 
(MDT), and promoting a strategic partnership with Japan. However, the 
Duterte administration is unravelling its predecessor’s balancing agenda 
by distancing itself from the United States and gravitating closer to China, 
despite the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) July 12 2016 award to 
the Philippines. President Duterte’s foreign policy is directed at reviving 
the equi-balancing policy on China, in contrast to then-President Aqui-
no’s balancing strategy. This is best exemplified by his efforts to harness 
China for several major infrastructure and investments projects in the 
Philippines and to resort to bilateral negotiations with Beijing. The pre-
sent article argues that instead of relying on the US, President Duterte is 
fostering closer security partnership with Japan to equi-balance an emer-
gent China.  
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Introduction 
Starting in 2010, former President Benigno Aquino III adopted a balanc-
ing or a challenging policy on China’s expansive maritime claim in the 
South China Sea. President Aquino countered China by shifting the 
AFP’s focus from domestic security to territorial defence, bolstering 
closer Philippine–US security relations; acquiring American military 
equipment; seeking from Washington an explicit security guarantee un-
der the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT); and promoting a strategic 
partnership with Japan. In late April 2014, the Philippines signed the 
2014 Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with its stra-
tegic ally – the US. Designed to constrain China, the agreement provides 
American forces with a strategic footprint through rotational presence in 
Philippine territory. By strengthening the country’s security relations with 
the US and Japan, the Philippines again became involved in a classical 
geo-political game among the great powers in East Asia. Clearly, Presi-
dent Aquino brought back “geo-politics” as a component of the coun-
try’s external relations, thereby triggering a “revolution” in Philippine 
foreign policy as he challenged China’s expansionist moves in the South 
China Sea.  
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte, however, is bent on unravelling the 
foreign policy agenda of President Aquino III, as he declared that he will 
pursue an “independent foreign policy.” After less than three months in 
office and following the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (PCA) land-
mark award to the Philippines in its territorial row with China in the 
South China Sea, President Duterte launched a diplomatic offensive to 
earn Chinese goodwill. He downplayed the South China Sea dispute in 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit meeting 
in Laos in an effort to curry diplomatic and economic concessions from 
China. President Duterte also declared that he wanted to distance the 
Philippines from the United States, a move that will not only alter the 
region’s strategic balance but mark a dramatic departure from his coun-
try’s long-standing policy of maintaining close security ties with its only 
strategic ally. After this trip to Laos, Duterte declared that the Philip-
pines would stop joining the US Navy in patrolling the South China Sea 
to avoid upsetting Beijing. He also said that he wanted American Special 
Forces (SOF) supporting the AFP in counter-terrorism operations in 
Mindanao to withdraw from the island. Consequently, his pronounce-
ments and actions eroded the Philippines’ influence in the ASEAN on 
the South China Sea issue and could potentially lead to a breakdown in 
Philippine–US security relations.  
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President Duterte is currently seeking Chinese assistance for the 
construction of drug-rehabilitation centres for Filipino drug dependents, 
soft loans for the constructions of railways in Mindanao and even the 
acquisition of Chinese-made weapons for the AFP. His goal is to foster 
closer economic and diplomatic relations with China while distancing the 
Philippines from the US. President Duterte’s foreign policy gambit is 
analogous to former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s equi-balancing 
policy on the US and China during the first decade of the 21st century. 
As a diplomatic strategy, equi-balancing refers to the Southeast Asian 
states’ policies “not to balance nor bandwagon with the great powers 
(the US, Japan, and China) but rather engage them through multinational 
institutions, particularly ASEAN and its offspring (the ARF and ASEAN 
+3)” (Simon 2008: 196). In applying this strategy, the small powers fos-
ter their diplomatic linkages and economic activities with two or more 
competing major powers to a level at which they are able to influence the 
major powers’ policies but still insulate themselves from undue external 
influence. However, instead of relying on the US, President Duterte is 
fostering a closer security partnership with Japan to equi-balance an 
emergent China. This article examines the dramatic shifts in Philippine 
foreign policy under the Duterte administration relative to the country’s 
relations with China and, to a certain degree, the United States. It ad-
dresses the following main questions: How is the Duterte administration 
unravelling the foreign policy agenda of the Aquino administration? 
What is the foreign policy agenda of the Duterte administration? And 
what are the changes and continuity in Philippine foreign policy in the 
face of China’s emergence in East Asia?  
The Aquino Administration: Balancing China’s 
Maritime Expansion  
Upon assuming the presidency in June 2010, Aquino declared his une-
quivocal advocacy of transparency and accountability in governance, and 
support for the AFP modernisation aligned with maritime/territorial 
defence. Irritants in the South China Sea dispute continued to strain 
Philippine–China relations. On 2 March 2011, two Chinese patrol boats 
harassed a survey ship commissioned by the Philippine Department of 
Energy (DOE) to conduct oil exploration in the Reed Bank (called by 
the Philippines Recto Bank), 150 kilometres east of the Spratly Islands 
and 250 kilometres west of the Philippine island of Palawan. The Aquino 
administration was stunned by the Chinese action since this maritime 
encounter happened east of the Spratlys and its adjacent waters. Two 
  142 Renato Cruz De Castro 
 
days after the incident, the Philippine government filed a protest with the 
Chinese embassy in Manila. A Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 
spokesperson commented that “the Philippines is (simply) seeking an 
explanation for the incident.” Brushing aside the Philippine complaint, a 
Chinese embassy official insisted that China has indisputable sovereignty 
over the Nansha Islands and their adjacent territory.  
In early June 2011, the Philippines sought clarification on the sight-
ings of China Marine Surveillance (CMS) and People’s Liberation Army’s 
Navy (PLAN) ships near the Kalayaan group of islands. Philippine de-
fence and foreign secretaries publicly expressed the Aquino administra-
tion’s serious concerns over the alleged Chinese intrusion into the coun-
try’s EEZ to stake China’s territorial claim and to construct a planned oil 
rig on the uninhabited Iroquois Bank. They asserted that these “are clear 
violations of the China-ASEAN 2001 Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties on the South China Sea” (Thayer 2011: 563). In response, the 
Chinese foreign ministry sternly told the Philippines to stop “harming 
China’s sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, which leads to 
unilateral actions that can expand and complicate South China Sea dis-
pute” (BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific 2011a: 1). Beijing then went on to 
demand that Manila first seek Chinese permission before it could con-
duct oil exploration activities even within the Philippines EEZ. China, in 
fact, badgered the Philippines and other claimant states to recognise 
China’s sovereign claim over the South China Sea (BBC Monitoring Asia-
Pacific 2011b: 1). China’s heavy-handed attitude and arrogant pronounce-
ments against the Philippines and Vietnam in the first half of 2011 esca-
lated the maritime row. By then, President Aquino had unmistakably 
seen that the Philippines were on a direct collision course with China 
regarding the South China Sea issue.  
The 2 March 2011 incident at the Reed Bank and China’s arrogant 
response to the Philippine diplomatic queries prompted the Aquino 
administration to hasten the development of the AFP’s territorial de-
fence capabilities. The Philippines’ territorial defence goal is to establish 
a modest but “comprehensive border protection programme” (National 
Security Council 2011: 39). This task is anchored on the surveillance, 
deterrence, and border patrol capabilities of the PAF, the PN, and the 
Philippine Coast Guard, which extend from the country’s territorial 
waters to its contiguous and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (National 
Security Council 2011: 39). This objective requires enhancement of the 
AFP’s capabilities, prioritisation of its needs, and gradual restructuring of 
its forces for territorial defence. The long-term goal, according to the 
2011 AFP’s Strategic Intent, is to maintain a “credible deterrent posture 
  The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy 143
 

 
against foreign intrusion or external aggression, and other illegal activities 
while allowing free navigation to prosper” (Office of Deputy Chief-of-
Staff 2011: 27). If deterrence fails, the last resort is to rely on hit-and-run 
tactics against the vastly superior Chinese navy and air force.  
Despite its determination to boost the AFP’s territorial defence ca-
pabilities, the Aquino administration was constrained by insufficient 
financial resources. President Aquino recognised both the urgency of 
modernizing the armed forces especially the PN and PAF, on the one 
side, and the limitations that competing demands (especially funds for 
education and public infrastructure) put on the military modernisation, 
on the other. From the Aquino administration’s perspective, arms mod-
ernisation should be undertaken simply for developing a credible defence 
posture and not for power projection capability or outright war-fighting 
purposes (Asia News Monitor 2014: 1).  
In 2012, after the tense two-month Scarborough Shoal standoff and 
later, China’s occupation of the shoal, Manila began efforts to negotiate 
with Washington the “Framework Agreement on Enhanced Rotational 
Presence and Agreement.” The agreement would facilitate the deploy-
ment of American troops and equipment on a rotational basis, thus 
avoiding the controversial issue of re-establishing US bases in the coun-
try. Interestingly, the negotiation was conducted against the backdrop of 
increased tensions between the Philippines and China because of their 
territorial dispute in the South China Sea. With its small and obsolete 
naval force and an almost non-existent air force, the Philippines was 
relying on the US to help in the modernisation of its military and defence 
capabilities through short-term regular visits by American forces that 
would conduct joint training, humanitarian and disaster response opera-
tions with the AFP. More significantly, the Philippines is also banking on 
the deterrent effect that can be generated by the temporary deployment 
of US forces and their equipment in its territory.  
On 28 April 2014, the Philippines and the United States signed the 
Enhance Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) a few hours before 
President Barack Obama’s arrival in the Philippines. The allies consider 
the EDCA as an executive agreement that merely updates and enhances 
the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty (Philippine News Agency 2014: 1). The 
EDCA provides the framework by which the Philippines and the US can 
develop their individual and collective (defence) capabilities. This would 
be through the rotational deployment of American forces in Philippine 
bases that can expand opportunities for training and support for the 
long-term modernisation of the Philippine military (Garamone 2014: 1). 
The agreement allows American forces to access and utilise designated 
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areas in AFP-owned and -controlled facilities but the Philippine base 
commander will have unhampered access to those agreed locations. It 
also provides that the US military can build or improve the infrastruc-
tures inside these agreed locations but will share these facilities with the 
AFP. Furthermore, any construction and other activities within those 
Philippine bases would require the consent of the host country through 
the MDB and the Security Engagement Board (SEB). 
The signing of the EDCA conveyed a strong diplomatic signal to 
Beijing that it would have to take account of American military presence 
in the Philippines if it was to use force against Manila to resolve their 
intense territorial dispute in the South China Sea. More significantly, 
temporary US military presence in its territory would strengthen the 
Philippines’ determination to uphold its territorial claims vis-à-vis China 
in the South China Sea dispute, and in the future, might also test Ameri-
can resolve and credibility to honour its defence commitment to the 
Philippines. The negotiations with the Philippines on rotational US mili-
tary presence also sent a message to other claimant states in the South 
China Sea dispute, such as Vietnam and even Malaysia, about the pro-
spect of bolstering their military relations with the US based on the 
terms that are acceptable to them.  
Aside from strengthening its alliance with the US, the Philippines 
also promoted its strategic partnership with Japan, China’s main rival in 
East Asia. In the aftermath of the Scarborough Shoal stand-off, Tokyo 
became more forthright in extending security assistance to the Philip-
pines. In July 2012, then Japanese Defence Minister Satoshi Morimoto, 
and his Filipino counterpart, Defence Secretary Gazmin, inked a bilateral 
agreement on maritime security. The agreement calls for high-level dia-
logues between defence officials and reciprocal visits by the MSDF chief 
of staff and the PN flag commander. It also features various security-
related activities such as the Multinational Cooperation Program in the 
Asia-Pacific (MCAP), multilateral logistic staff talks (MLST), training 
exchanges and subject matter exchanges on HADR and logistics; and 
exchange visits and student exchanges in the two countries’ respective 
staff colleges. A few days later, then Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary 
Albert del Rosario announced that Tokyo was likely to provide the PCG 
with 10 40-meter boats as part of Japan’s ODA to the Philippines by the 
end of 2012. Newspapers also reported that two additional bigger vessels 
are being considered for transfer to the Philippine government under a 
grant.  
In his visit to Japan in early June 2015, former President Aquino 
and Prime Minister Abe signed a joint declaration on “A Strengthened 
  The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy 145
 

 
Strategic Partnership for Advancing the Shared Principles and Partner-
ship and Goals for Peace, Security, and Growth in the Region and Be-
yond.” The communiqué commits Japan to the following: (1) enhancing 
the capacity of the PCG, (2) cooperating with the Philippines on mari-
time security specifically on maritime domain awareness, and (3) raising 
the prospects for the transfer of Japanese defence equipment and tech-
nology to the Philippines (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015: 4). In a press 
briefing, President Aquino announced the forthcoming negotiations on a 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that would allow SDF access to 
Philippine military bases. He disclosed that Philippine–Japan SOFA is 
possible since both countries have boosted their security relationship 
significantly over the past few years. The SDF’s use of Philippine bases 
on a limited and rotational basis will be useful as Japan actively pursues a 
policy of pro-active contribution to peace in East Asia. With refuelling 
and basing facilities in the Philippines, units of the ASDF and MSDF can 
conduct joint patrols with their American counterparts for a longer peri-
od of time and over a larger area of the South China Sea.  
Aside from fostering its security ties with the US and Japan, the 
Philippines also opted to apply a legal/liberal approach to constrain 
China’s maritime expansion in the South China Sea. In January 2013, the 
Philippines directly confronted China’s expansive claim in the South 
China Sea by filing a statement of claim against China in the Arbitral 
Tribunal of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In its 
Notification and Statement of Claim, the Philippines asked the arbitral 
tribunal to determine the country’s legal entitlements under the UN-
CLOS to the Spratly Islands, Scarborough Shoal, Mischief Reef, and 
other land features within its 200-mile EEZ. These entitlements are 
based on the provisions of the UNCLOS, specifically it’s the Philippines’ 
rights to a Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone under Part II, to an 
Exclusive Economic Zone under Part V, and to a Continental Shelf 
under Part VI (Department of Foreign Affairs 2013: 12–14).  
In its statement of claim, the Philippines made it clear that it does 
not seek arbitration over which party has sovereignty over the islands. 
Rather, it merely requested the arbitral tribunal to issue an opinion on 
the following issues: (a) whether China’s maritime claim in the South 
China Sea based on its so-called nine-dash line claim is valid or contrary 
to UNCLOS; and (b) whether Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuar-
teron Reef, and Fiery Reef, which are submerged features and that are 
below sea level at high tide are islands or rocks under Article 121 (3) of 
the Convention. The Philippines also petitioned the Arbitral Tribunal to 
declare that the Philippines is entitled to a 12-mile Territorial Sea, a 200-
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mile EEZ, and a Continental Shelf under Parts II, V, and VI of UN-
CLOS and that China has unlawfully prevented the Philippines from 
exercising its rights to exploit resources in its EEZ and to navigation 
within and beyond the 200-mile of the Philippines’ archipelagic baselines 
(Department of Foreign Affairs 2013: 18–19).  
Questioning the Geopolitical Agenda  
During his campaign for the presidency, Davao City Mayor Rodrigo 
Duterte was highly critical of the Aquino administration’s balancing 
policy on China relative to the South China Sea dispute. As a self-
proclaimed social-democratic and nationalist, Duterte declared during his 
sorties that he was willing to have bilateral talks with China over the 
West Philippine Sea/South China Sea dispute. He also suggested the 
possibility of joint exploration of the South China Sea’s natural resources 
and expressed that he would like to see China building railroads in the 
troubled island of Mindanao in exchange for his temporary silence on 
the maritime dispute (Steinbock 2016: 1). Mayor Duterte declared that, 
unlike his predecessor, he was open to engaging China in bilateral nego-
tiations, to pursuing joint development of resources in the South China 
Sea and to downplaying the sovereignty dispute if China also stopped 
insisting on its own sovereignty claim (Baviera 2016: 203). Duterte was 
also disparaging of the Philippine–US alliance as he said that he had little 
confidence that the United States would honour its treaty commitment 
to the Philippines when it comes to the South China Sea dispute. 
Before his inauguration on 30 June 2016, Duterte declared that he 
wanted a closer relation with China and that he wouldn’t continue the 
military modernisation programme started by his predecessor. His early 
statements indicated that he would not pursue the modernisation of the 
AFP with as much vigour as President Aquino. Observers thought that 
President Duterte would follow former President Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo’s national security policy of gravitating close to China while ig-
noring territorial defence and focusing on neutralising domestic security 
challenges such terrorism and insurgencies. The modernisation of the 
AFP was linked to President Aquino’s agenda of challenging China’s 
expansive maritime claim in the South China Sea. President Duterte’s 
agenda to improve bilateral relations with China may mean that public 
investments in territorial defence would be decreased, if not terminated. 
Thus, one noted Filipino academic noted: “It may be anticipated that 
under Duterte, the Philippines may revert to hedging strategy on China, 
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in contrast to Aquino who had edged too close to balancing/contain-
ment policy” (Baviera 2016: 205). 
The PCA Award to the Philippines: Signalling 
an Entente with China  
After a three-year wait, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ren-
dered its ruling on the maritime dispute between the Philippines and 
China on 12 July 2016. The five-judge tribunal unanimously ruled in 
favour of the Philippines on almost all of the claims in made against 
China. The PCA rendered China’s claim to historic rights through its 
nine-dash line in the South China Sea as contrary to international law. 
The PCA determined that none of the Spratlys are legally islands because 
they cannot sustain a stable human community or independent economic 
life. Finally, it found China of guilty of damaging the marine environ-
ment by building artificial islands, of illegally preventing Filipinos from 
fishing and conducting oil explorations in the Philippines’ EEZs. 
Despite its overwhelming legal victory and the fact that the 12 July 
2016 PCA ruling was the most anticipated decision of any international 
court or tribunal on the law of the sea, the Duterte administration met 
the decision with a sober, cautious, and even muted reaction. The Duter-
te administration’s response was ultra-low-key as he fulfilled his earlier 
promise that he would not flaunt a favourable ruling over China. Alt-
hough the domestic reaction was overwhelmingly positive and jubilant, 
Philippine Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay merely said that he wel-
comed the ruling and called on the Filipinos to exercise restraint and 
sobriety. During the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Laos, Secre-
tary Yasay withdrew the country’s motion to include the PCA decision in 
the ASEAN Joint Communique after Cambodia objected to its inclusion. 
Assigned to be the country’s special envoy to China, former President 
Fidel Ramos even suggested that the president should set the PCA award 
aside as his administration pursues bilateral negotiations with China. 
Clearly, the Duterte administration is sending signals to China that it is 
willing to appease its realpolitik agenda in the South China Sea. 
The Philippine government’s cautious reaction to the PCA awards 
was due to the Duterte administration’s fear that flaunting its legal victo-
ry against China might force the later to react adversely against Filipino 
fishermen and Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) units stationed 
on islands occupied by the Philippines in the South China Sea. This was 
also because of the government’s realisation that it cannot implement the 
PCA’s rewards because of the weakness of the Philippine Navy (PN) and 
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the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) compared with the large and well-
equipped Chinese naval and civilian presence in the South China Sea. 
Beijing immediately declared that it was ready to start negotiations with 
Manila on the South China Sea dispute if the latter ignored the 12 July 
2016 PCA award (Associated Press 2016: 1). Accordingly, negotiations 
between the Philippines and China could cover “issues such as joint 
development and cooperation in scientific research if the new govern-
ment puts the Tribunal ruling aside before returning to the table for talks” 
(Reuters 2016: 1). China also threatened the Philippines with possible 
confrontation if the latter insisted on using the PCA decision as the basis 
for the bilateral negotiation (Viray 2016: 1). The Philippines rejected 
China’s pre-condition for bilateral negotiation, citing that it was not 
consistent with the country’s constitution and national interests (Viray 
2016: 1). On 21 July 2016, Presidential Spokesperson Ernesto Abella 
announced that the Philippines would consider the views of its allies in 
its engagements with China, whose expansive territorial claim in the 
South China Sea was declared void by the PCA (Romero 2016a: 1).  
Before the ASEAN summit in Laos in September 2016, President 
Duterte said that the July 12 PCA ruling was purely a bilateral issue be-
tween the Philippines and China, not a matter for ASEAN, echoing both 
Cambodia’s and China’s position on this matter. On 13 September 2016, 
he announced an end to Philippine–US joint patrols in the South China 
and, instead, the PN should only limit its patrol within the country’s 
territorial waters to avoid provoking other countries (Solomon and Cull-
ison 2016: 1). In his speech at the Center of Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) in Washington DC in late September 2016, Secretary 
Yasay reasoned out “that joint patrols (with the US) could be seen by 
China as a provocative acting, making it more difficult to peacefully 
resolve territorial disputes” (Katigbak 2016: 1). Interestingly, he then 
added that the Philippines is quietly making arrangements through dip-
lomatic channels for bilateral talks with China without any preconditions 
to discuss their competing claims in the South China Sea. Clearly, the 
Duterte administration is determined to establish an entente with China 
even though Chinese Navy and Coast Guard vessels are operating inside 
sensitive parts of the South China Sea such as in the Scarborough Shoal 
and Mischief Reef, and despite the PCA’s ruling that favoured the Phil-
ippine against China.  
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Unravelling the Balancing Agenda 
In the first weeks of its term, the Duterte administration seemed to be 
following his predecessor’s balancing agenda on China. A few days after 
President Duterte’s inauguration on 30 June 2016, Secretary of National 
Defence (DND) Delfin Lorenzana assured the AFP and the Filipino 
public that the Duterte administration would pursue the modernisation 
of the Philippine military (Laude 2016: 1). Secretary Lorenzana accentu-
ated that territorial defence is one of the priorities of the Duterte admin-
istration because “it is very important as we need to protect our territo-
ries against encroachment by other parties” (Philippine News Agency 
2016: 1). He then added that the 15-year AFP modernisation programme 
would continue as scheduled. However, Secretary Lorenzana clarified 
that there will be some “redirection” as the Duterte administration is 
determined to decisively deal with criminality, especially the Abu Sayyaf 
bandits, as it gives the Philippines a bad name due to its series of kid-
nappings of Malaysian and Indonesian sailors off the Sulu Sea (Philippine 
News Agency 2016: 2).  
In the aftermath of the 12 July PCA award to the Philippines, Secre-
tary Lorenza highlighted the urgent need for the Philippines to upgrade 
its coast guard, navy, and air force to prevent other countries from en-
croaching on its territory, especially its maritime territory (Nepomuceno 
2016: 1). He added that  
In the long run, we will still follow our modernisation [programme] 
because you know it jibes with what our long-term plans [of] hav-
ing credible deterrence to secure our territory (especially) maritime 
plan. (NewsDesk 2016: 1) 
These developments seemed to indicate, that despite its earlier pro-
nouncement about reviving the bilateral negotiations with China and 
conducting joint developments in the South China Sea, the Duterte ad-
ministration was taking into account its predecessors’ agenda of chal-
lenging China’s expansive claim in the disputed waters. One prominent 
Filipino academic even quipped: “Duterte’s foreign policy will not only 
depend on his personal preferences and inclinations but, like his prede-
cessors, will be defined by other internal and external factors” (Baviera 
2016: 206). 
However, President Duterte changed gear after the United States 
became critical of his domestic agenda of waging a so-called war on 
drugs and criminality that had claimed more than 3,000 lives since May 
2017. His current pronouncements and decisions indicate that he plans 
to distance the Philippines from its only strategic ally, the United States. 
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At the same time, he wants warmer and closer relations with China, 
despite the PCA’s award invalidating its expansive claim in the South 
China Sea, and the presence of Chinese Coast Guard vessels near sensi-
tive spots in the South China Sea, such as around Scarborough Shoal and 
Mischief Reefs, both deep inside the Philippines’ EEZ.  
During the two ASEAN summits and the East Asian Summit (EAS) 
in Laos, President Duterte gave remarks that were interpreted as insult-
ing to President Barack Obama. This led to the cancellation of the 
scheduled bilateral meetings between the two heads of states. Duterte 
then skipped the US-ASEAN Summit and then, instead of reading his 
prepared speech on the PCA award to the Philippines, criticised Ameri-
can human rights abuses allegedly committed against the Filipino Mus-
lims in Mindanao in the early 20th century. This was President Duterte’s 
response to Washington’s growing criticism of alleged human rights 
violations resulting from his anti-narcotics/anti-criminal campaign in the 
Philippines (Oxford Daily Brief Service 2016: 1). 
On 12 September 2016, President Duterte suddenly announced that 
US special forces operating in Mindanao must leave the country, arguing 
that there could be no peace in this southern Philippine islands as long as 
these American troops are operating there (Cagahastian 2016: 3). He also 
warned that they are vulnerable to Abu Sayyaf bandits who could kidnap 
or kill them, thus complicating the prevailing problem of peace and or-
der in Mindanao (Cagahastian 2016: 3). The following day, he announced 
that the PN would stop joint patrol with the US Navy in the Philippines’ 
EEZ in order to avoid upsetting China (Moss 2016: 1). Philippine For-
eign Secretary Perfecto Yasay explained that “the inadequately armed 
Philippine military cannot fight China in any battle, thus, President 
Duterte ordered the Navy not conduct joint patrols in the South China 
Sea with the US Navy” (Katigbak 2016: 1). He then said that Philippine–
US patrols in the South China Sea could be seen by China as a provoca-
tive act, making it more difficult to peacefully resolve the two countries’ 
territorial dispute (Katigbak 2016: 1). Accordingly, rather “than worry 
over a possible war in the South China Sea,” President Duterte encour-
aged the military “to focus on domestic security challenges such as 
fighting drug lords and traffickers, and insurgents” (Moss 2016: 2). 
During his two-day official visit in Vietnam in late September 2017, 
Duterte announced that the Philippine–US amphibious landing exercise 
(Phiblex) 2016 that took place from 4–12 October 2016 would be the 
last military exercise between the two allies during his term (Aurelio 
2016: 1). President Duterte explained that while he pledged to honour 
the long-standing defence treaty with the US, China opposes joint mili-
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tary drills in the Philippines, leaving him with no choice but to cancel 
such exercises with the US (Aurelio 2016: 1). President Duterte’s state-
ment on the termination of joint Philippine–US military exercises is 
considered the strongest indication of a slow break-down in the alliance 
that the Obama administration has been trying to shore up in the light of 
the US strategic rebalancing to Asia.  
While distancing himself from the US, President Duterte has pur-
sued a calibrated foreign policy characterised by gravitating closer to 
China. He has declared that he is opened to direct bilateral negotiations 
with China. In contrast, former President Aquino brought the dispute to 
international arbitration at the Permanent Court of International Arbitra-
tion in The Hague in the Netherlands. In an effort to win China’s confi-
dence, he declared that the 12 July Permanent Court of Arbitration 
Award to the Philippines is purely a bilateral issue between the Philip-
pines and China, not a matter for the ASEAN, echoing Chinese position 
on this matter (Oxford Daily Brief Service 2016: 2). President Duterte’s 
foreign secretary, Perfecto Yasay, declared that:  
the relationship between the two countries [China and the Philip-
pines] was not limited to the maritime dispute. There were other 
areas of concern in such fields as investment, trade, and tourism 
and discussing then could open the doors for talks on the mari-
time issues. (Katigbak 2016: 2) 
In late September 2017, President Duterte announced that he would 
forge “new alliances” with China and Russia to cushion the fallout from 
the possible withdrawal of the US from the Philippines in 2017 (Caba-
cungan 2016: 1). In a speech delivered in the province of Pampanga, he 
urged Filipinos to make a small sacrifice for what he described as his 
plan to “cross the Rubicon” in his ties with the US, as he is pursuing 
partnerships with rival countries (China and Russia) or what he called 
countries on the other side of the ideological barrier (Cabacungan 2016: 
1). He also announced that he would visit Russia and China in 2016 to 
chart an independent foreign policy and “open (new) alliances” with 
these two regional powers that have historic rivalries with the Philippines’ 
only strategic ally: the US In his major speeches and policy initiatives in 
October 2016, Duterte signalled that he is creating a diplomatic/strategic 
distance between the Philippines and the United States, while also plan-
ning to pivot towards the US’s geo-strategic rivals – China and Russia 
(Agence France Press 2016: 1). Duterte announced that 250 Filipino busi-
nessmen would accompany him when he visits China on 20–21 October 
2017, as he puts aside years of hostility to seek a new partnership with 
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China at a time when tension between the Philippines and its traditional 
ally, the US, was mounting (Morales and Lerma 2016: 1).  
During his 21 October state visit to Beijing, President Duterte de-
clared his separation from the United States and his realignment with 
China as the two countries agreed to resolve their dispute in the South 
China Sea through bilateral negotiations. President Duterte’s declaration 
of his separation from his country’s only treaty ally was seen as a serious 
setback for the United States, and a great Chinese diplomatic victory as 
this would have “a radiating effect in the region that would bring other 
estranged neighbours closer to China’s orbit” (People’s Daily 2016: 2). 
This move revealed President Duterte’s scheme of moving the Philip-
pines away from its traditional links to the US toward a more independ-
ent posture so it can adroitly balance the major powers in East Asia, 
similar to what President Arroyo did during her nine-year term.  
President Duterte is reviving the equi-balancing strategy to replace 
the Aquino administration’s balancing policy on China. The purpose of 
this strategy is to create a more positive political atmosphere in Philip-
pine–China bilateral relations that can allow both sides to embark on 
major infrastructure and investment projects, as well as other forms of 
cooperation that may help restore mutual trust and confidence (Baviera 
2016: 205). However, unlike President Arroyo, who tried to balance the 
Philippines’ relation with both China and the US, President Duterte 
seems to be determined to effect a major break from the US as he vowed 
to review the 2014 EDCA, which provides American forces temporary 
access to Philippine military bases (Romero 2016b: 1). President Duter-
te’s pronouncements point to his goal of unravelling his predecessor’s 
balancing policy of challenging China’s expansive claims in the South 
China Sea as he alienates his country’s long-standing ally while moving 
closer to a regional power bent on effecting a territorial revision in the 
East Asia.  
However, President Duterte’s independent foreign policy could 
prove domestically unpopular as it goes against the widely held percep-
tion of a China threat among ordinary Filipinos, and alienates the coun-
try’s traditional economic and security partners such as Japan, the United 
States, and the European Union (Lopez 2016: 1). Also, Duterte’s tirades 
against the US and friendly overtures to the Philippines’ main protago-
nist in the South China Sea do not sit well with the AFP. Military officers 
who have spent their lives and careers in working with the US military 
fighting communists and Islamic militants are not comfortable with the 
sudden and dramatic shift in the country’s foreign policy (Moss 2016: 1). 
These officers are also anxious that the president is throwing away the 
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only card that the Philippines has to play in its territorial dispute with the 
China in the South China Sea: the American security umbrella (Moss 
2016: 1). Concerned about the sudden changes in Philippine foreign 
policy, the Philippine Senate is set to conduct an inquiry on the foreign 
policy direction of the Duterte administration (Doctolero 2016: 1) The 
senate probe was triggered by what some senators see as the current 
administration’s lack of a clear strategic foreign policy goal and the con-
flicting positions between the president and his cabinet officials on sev-
eral foreign policy issues (Doctolero 2016: 1). 
President Duterte’s new foreign policy direction has become unset-
tling not only for many Filipinos but also for its allies such as the US and 
Japan, and presumably in among ASEAN countries, which see the arbi-
tration case alongside the country’s active support for the US military 
presence in Southeast Asia as pillars of stability in the management of 
their own relations with China. American officials admitted that the 
Obama administration has been stunned by the position of the President 
Duterte and was still working out how to respond (Solomon and Cull-
ison 2016: 2). Puzzled by the changes in Philippine foreign policy, the 
Japanese government decided to persevere with its nuanced or unique 
approach in dealing with the Philippines. A senior Japanese official ad-
mitted that while Tokyo and Washington share the same goal in the 
Philippines, Japan takes a different approach in its relations with the 
Philippines, as there are some things that Manila can only accept when 
Japan provides them (Wanklyn and Mie 2016: 1). Unlike the US, which 
has been taken aback by President Duterte’s anti-American pronounce-
ments, Japan continued its comprehensive engagement with the Philip-
pines (Wanklyn and Mie 2016: 1).  
Ironically, while President Duterte is seeking a fresh relationship 
with Beijing, he is also fostering a security partnership with China’s 
foremost rival in East Asia: Japan. Although Duterte has been very criti-
cal of the Philippine–US alliance, he has never criticised or even men-
tioned the Philippine–Japan security partnership. Prior to his working 
visit to Japan, Duterte expressed his willingness to advance defence co-
operation between the Philippines and Japan (Jiji Press English News Service 
2016: 1). During his working visit to Japan in October 2016, President 
Duterte discussed maritime security cooperation with Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe. President Duterte sought Japan’s support for joint ventures 
in key infrastructure development, especially in terms of harnessing Jap-
anese expertise in developing a high-quality and modern public transpor-
tation system. More significantly, he also engaged Prime Minister Abe in 
a discussion of greater politico-social and defence cooperation, particu-
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larly in maritime domain awareness and maritime security (Cabacungan 
2016: 2).  
During his visit, he signed the Exchange of Notes on Japanese Of-
ficial Development Assistance for the provision of two large-scale patrol 
vessels that were put aside from the 10 patrol vessels that Tokyo is in the 
process of delivering to the PCG. Japan’s provision of the two 90-meter 
patrol vessels will boost the capabilities of the PCG since white ships are 
often used on the front line of the various territorial dispute in maritime 
East Asia, given that the deployment of grey ships in disputed waters is 
seen as overly provocative. On 12 October, the PCG commissioned the 
first multi-role response vessel (MRRV), PCGS Tubbataha, which will be 
used for patrol, search and rescue, and law-enforcement operation in the 
Philippine maritime territory. The remaining nine vessels will be deliv-
ered serially until 2018. In the past few years, Japan has provided rescue 
equipment, training facilities, communication systems, maritime safety 
equipment, satellite-based communication system and a vessel traffic 
management system (VTMS) to the PCG.  
Significantly, Japan has provided the Philippines with military 
equipment and training. President Duterte also witnessed the signing of 
the Memorandum of Implementation and Letter of Arrangement for the 
transfer of Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF)’s training air-
craft TC-90 maritime reconnaissance planes for the PN (Cigaral 2016: 1). 
Japan will also provide training for PN aviators and develop the infra-
structures for these reconnaissance aircraft that will patrol the South 
China Sea (Cigaral 2016: 1). Interestingly, President Duterte also hinted 
that the Philippine could conduct naval exercises with Japan, but he 
repeated that there would no more joint exercises with the United States.  
The most important accomplishment of Duterte’s working visit to 
Japan was the two countries’ signing of the 26 October 2016 Japan-
Philippine Joint Statement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016: 1). The 
statement commits both countries to the maintenance of the freedom of 
navigation and overflight in the South China Sea that holds the sea lanes 
vital for global economic activity and viability. The two leaders also reaf-
firmed the importance of the stronger (security) ties between Japan and 
the Philippines to promote the peace, stability and maritime security of 
the region. The statement also highlights the importance of alliances as it 
states:  
The two leaders look to their network of friendships and alliances, 
in particular the ever stronger ties between the Japan and the Phil-
ippines, to help promote the peace, stability and maritime security 
of the region. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016: 2) 
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On one hand, President Duterte’s decision to enhance the Philippine–
Japan security partnership indicate that, despite his efforts to improve 
Philippine–China economic relations, he sees the need to equi-balance 
among the major powers. A strengthened security partnership with Japan 
enables the Philippines to effectively play its classic diplomatic gambit of 
equi-balancing, or the art of pitting one great power against the other, 
thus preventing the Philippines from effecting a total pivot to China. On 
the other hand, Japan’s goal is to assist the Philippines improve its mari-
time surveillance capabilities in the light of increasing Chinese maritime 
activities in the South China Sea. Aware that strained Philippine–US 
relations benefit China, Japan is strengthening its relations with the 
Duterte administration by fostering periodic consultations between the 
two countries, and strengthening its navy’s and coast guard’s maritime 
domain awareness capabilities. Japan is the only Western country with a 
healthy and cordial relationship with the Philippines, making it an im-
portant counter-vailing force to an expected increase in Chinese influ-
ence in the light of President Duterte’s efforts to forge a new economic 
partnership with China. This is only natural because Japan is one of the 
Philippines’ most important trade partners and the country’s biggest 
source of foreign direct investments. Japan is also the Philippines’ largest 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) donor.  
Conclusion  
From 2011 to 2016, the Aquino administration pursued a balancing 
policy on China as it promoted closer security cooperation with the US. 
This policy can be traced back to 2011, when President Aquino stood up 
to China’s expansive claim and heavy-handed behaviour in the South 
China Sea. He redirected the AFP’s focus from domestic security to 
territorial defence, fostered deeper Philippine–US security arrangements, 
acquired American military equipment and sought from Washington an 
unequivocal security guarantee under the 1951 MDT. The most salient 
component of this foreign policy was the signing of the EDCA, which 
provided American forward-deployed forces strategic rotational presence 
in Philippine territory, as well as extensive access to Philippine military 
facilities. The agreement was forged in order to strategically constrain 
China, which has increased its territorial foothold in the South China Sea. 
Predictably, the consequences of this policy shift are two-pronged: it has 
strengthened Philippine–US alliance and inescapably strained Philippine–
China bilateral relations.  
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President Duterte’s pronouncements and actions point to his goal 
of unravelling his predecessor’s foreign policy agenda of balancing Chi-
na’s expansive claim in the South China Sea. He has distanced his coun-
try from its long-standing treaty ally while moving closer to a regional 
power bent on effecting a territorial revision in the East Asia. His foreign 
policy is aimed at reviving the equi-balancing policy on China, in contrast 
to President Aquino’s balancing strategy. This is best exemplified by his 
efforts to harness China to several major infrastructure and investments 
projects in the Philippines and to resort to bilateral negotiations with 
Beijing. However, President Duterte’s efforts to gravitate closer to China 
at a time when Philippine–US security relations are at rock bottom creat-
ed a popular misconception that the Philippines is about to embark on a 
total pivot toward China. Ironically, while President Duterte is seeking a 
fresh relationship with Beijing; he is also fostering a security partnership 
with China’s main rival in East Asia: Japan. President Duterte has been 
very critical about the Philippine–US alliance but has never publicly 
criticised or even mentioned the Philippine–Japan security partnership. A 
functioning security partnership with Japan has also enabled the Philip-
pines to effectively play its classic diplomatic gambit of equi-balancing. 
Japan is the only Western country to have a healthy and cordial relation-
ship with the Philippines, making it an important counter-vailing force to 
an expected increase in Chinese influence in the light of President Duter-
te’s efforts to forge a new economic partnership with China. 
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